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Political knowledge has been shown to influence a host of substantively 
important outcomes, such as participation, issue preference and vote choice.  
The causes of individual heterogeneity in knowledge have gone relatively 
unexplored however. What leads some individuals to become political 
sophisticates and others not? Generally, motivation has been considered as 
key in this regard; those who are interested in politics seek out and retain 
political information which leads, in turn, to higher levels of interest in 
politics. Using data from the 1992-1997 and 1997-2001 British Election Panel 
Studies, however, we find no evidence of a reciprocal effects mechanism. 
Although this ‘virtuous circle’ model of sophistication has accrued some 
empirical support in the US, with British data we find evidence only for a 
uni-directional effect from interest to knowledge. We argue that previous 
analyses are potentially flawed due to their reliance on cross-sectional data 
and likely violation of model assumptions. 
 
It is increasingly apparent that political knowledge has a significant role to play in 
explaining variation in political attitudes and behaviour (Delli Carpini and Keeter 
1996; Bartels 1996; Althaus 1998; 2003; Converse 2000). Whether this emphasis is 
genuinely novel or simply a return to the ideas of ‘sophistication’ that had their hey-
day in the in the 1960s (Campbell et al 1960, Converse 1964) is debateable.  It is 
nonetheless clear, however, that scholars investigating electoral behaviour can no 
longer ignore the fact that voters vary in how much they know about politics. 
Virtually all major theoretical accounts of voting decisions now include political 
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 knowledge in some form or another. Advocates of economic voting have shown that 
the influence of information about the economy on preferences is moderated by 
political knowledge, and not always in the expected direction. For example, 
although, as we might expect, economic news coverage has greater influence on the 
vote intentions of more sophisticated citizens (Krause 1997), it appears that 
‘pocketbook’ voting is also, counter-intuitively, more prevalent among the more 
knowledgeable (Mutz 1993, Gomez and Wilson 2001). Equally, issue voting, ‘core-
values’ and social group explanations of vote choice are now assumed to interact 
with political knowledge. This moderation effect applies not only to vote choice 
(Bartels 1996; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Zaller 1992; Tilley and Heath 2003; 
Bartle 1997), but also to the impact of values (Brewer 2003; Goren 2001; Zaller 1991, 
1992; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996) and the media (Krosnick and Kinder 1990; 
Krosnick and Brannon 1993) on policy preferences. 
 Yet despite this wealth of research on the exogenous influence of knowledge 
on attitudes and behaviour, little attention has been paid to the antecedents of 
variation in political knowledge within and between individual voters. Extant 
empirical investigations have mostly relied on regression-based analysis of cross-
sectional data. On the whole this has shown that, while social characteristics such as 
age and social class are only weakly related to political knowledge, the strongest 
predictors tend to be cognitive variables such as political interest, educational 
attainment and media consumption (see for example Neuman 1981; Lambert et al 
1988; Nadeau and Niemi 1995; Bennett 1988, 1996; Bartle 1997, Delli Carpini and 
Keeter 1996).  
Two main explanations are offered as to why this is the case. The first 
assumes that knowledge, interest, education and media consumption are essentially 
indicators of the same latent ‘political sophistication’ construct. At its crudest level 
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 this perspective posits that knowledge, interest and so forth can be regarded as 
synonymous. Indeed, several authors investigating the conceptual basis of political 
sophistication use these indicators interchangeably, or combined into an additive 
scale (for example, Macdonald et al (1995) use interest and education as a proxy for 
sophistication). Under close scrutiny, however, it is clear that an individual’s interest 
in, attention to, knowledge of and interest in politics are, theoretically and 
empirically, quite distinct.  
A conceptually more credible approach treats sophistication as multi-
dimensional, with each sub-dimension having somewhat different causes and effects. 
Neuman (1986) specifies three main dimensions of sophistication in politics; political 
‘knowledge’, political ‘salience’ and political ‘conceptualization’. While political 
‘salience’ does to some extent conflate attentiveness to the media with interest in 
information received from the media, it is clearly an improvement to specify these 
dimensions as sub-components, rather than merely observed indicators of the 
broader sophistication construct (Neuman 1986, Guo and Moy 1998). 
 The problem with this multi-dimensional approach is that the possibly causal 
relationships between the main factors remain unexplained and unexplored. Thus, 
many authors have tended to concentrate on knowledge as the primary facet of 
sophistication, with political interest and media exposure posited as its primary 
exogenous causes (e.g. Bartle 2000). While this may result in models that are able to 
reliably predict variation in citizen knowledge, there is a clear danger that these 
estimates suffer a significant endogeneity bias. For, while political interest may 
indeed by fully exogenous to information holding, it is easy to construct a coherent 
narrative which suggests that increased knowledge of a subject such as politics might  
also lead to a concomitant increase in interest in that subject. As Smith puts it: 
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  “Interest in politics presumably causes people to pay more attention to politics 
and thus to learn more about politics… but knowing  a good deal about politics 
is likely to make people more interested in it”  
(Smith 1989, p192).  
 
While such a ‘virtuous circle’ model of political knowledge and interest appears to be 
an implicit assumption in much sophistication research (see, for example, Delli 
Carpini and Keeter 1996: p347), few studies have attempted to empirically confirm 
the existence of this non-recursive relationship. Two exceptions to this rule are 
Nadeau et al (1995) and Luskin (1990), both of which provide support for a reciprocal 
effects model using 2 Stage Least Squares  (2SLS) regression on U.S. cross-sectional 
data. While these instrumental variable approaches are a considerable improvement 
on conventional strategies of handling simultaneity in cross-sectional analyses, their 
estimates will only be unbiased if a rather strict set of assumptions about the 
structure of the variance/covariance matrix can be met (Bowden and Turkington 
1984; Finkel 1995).  
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Figure 1 shows a (simplified) version of Luskin’s sophistication model. In order to 
identify the reciprocal paths, the instruments for interest and knowledge need to be 
distinct; i.e. each block of instruments must be strong predictors of one endogenous 
variable but only weakly related to the other. Luskin uses parental interest and age 
as his instruments for respondent political interest, and education, media usage and 
social class as his instruments for political knowledge. While this specification is 
sufficient to allow model identification, it is not at all clear that the full set of 
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 assumptions for unbiased 2SLS estimation have been met. In particular, the 
specification of zero covariance between education, media use and political interest 
seems, at best, expedient. Indeed Smith, in his exhaustive treatment of the question, 
cautions against this type of specification:  
 
 “What causes sophistication that does not also cause interest? … I could 
arbitrarily identify the model with a series of false assumptions. For instance 
I could claim that education causes interest in politics, but nothing else … 
But making such false assumptions would just be biasing and distorting the 
results”  
(Smith 1989, p194).  
 
Thus, a more theoretically plausible model would be as shown in Figure 2, 
with all regression paths estimated between exogenous and endogenous variables 
and a reciprocal path between interest and knowledge.  
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
This parameterization would, however, re-introduce the identification 
problem that Luskin’s specification is designed to avoid. The estimation problem for 
these parameters would appear, then, to be near intractable with cross-sectional data.  
Analysis of repeated measures data sidesteps many of the endogeneity 
problems inherent in data collected at a single time point as observations at time t1 
can clearly not influence observations at time t-1. However, repeated measures of 
political knowledge on probability samples of the general population are extremely 
rare. This is primarily because survey researchers are rightly wary of endangering 
the cooperation of already reluctant respondents by repeatedly administering ‘tests’, 
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 but also because there is a basic, if implicit, assumption that political knowledge is 
highly stable in the short to medium term and little point, therefore, in repeatedly 
measuring it. In the remainder of this paper, we take advantage of British panel data 
containing repeated measures of both political knowledge and interest to separate 
out the causal effects of each on the other over time 
 
Data and Measures  
We use data from two panel surveys, the British Election Panel Study of 1997-2001 
and a truncated version of the 1992-1997 British Election Panel Study running from 
1995-1997. We were unable to use the full 1992-1997 panel because the knowledge 
and interest questions were not administered in the 1992-1994 waves. We use a 
complete case analysis, taking only those respondents who participated in all five 
waves for the 1997-2001 panel and those who participated in the 1995, 1996 and 1997 
waves of the 1992-1997 panel.  
 
Political Knowledge 
Following Andersen (Andersen 2003; see also Andersen et al 2002, 2004), we use the 
correct ordering of the three main British political parties1 on three different issue 
dimensions as our measure of political knowledge. The three issue dimensions are: 
European integration, income redistribution; and taxation and spending. For each 
issue, respondents are presented with an 11-point scale with contrasting statements 
anchoring each pole (for example, 1 reading “cut taxes and spend less” and 11 
reading “increase taxes and spend more”) and are asked to locate first themselves, 
then the three main parties on each dimension.  The questions read as follows: 
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 European Integration 
“Some people feel that Britain should do all it can to unite fully with 
the European Union. These people would put themselves in Box 1. 
Other people feel that Britain should do all it can to protect its 
independence from the European Union. These people would put 
themselves in Box 11.” 
 
Income redistribution 
 “Some people fell that government should make much greater efforts 
to make people’s incomes more equal. These people would put 
themselves in Box 1. Other people feel that government should be 
much less concerned about how equal people’s incomes are. These 
people would put themselves in Box 11.” 
 
Taxation and spending 
 “Some people feel that the government should put up taxes a lot and 
spend much more on health and social services. These people would 
put themselves in Box 1. Other people feel that the government 
should cut taxes a lot and spend much less on health and social 
services. These people would put themselves in Box 11.” 
 
For each dimension, therefore, there are three rankings that respondents can get 
either right or wrong: Conservative v Labour; Conservative v Liberal Democrat; and 
Labour v Liberal Democrat. On all three dimensions the correct ranking places the 
Conservatives to the right of both Labour and the Liberal Democrats. On Europe and 
tax/spend, the correct ranking placed Labour to the right of the Liberal Democrats, 
while on equalising incomes, the rank ordering places Labour to the left of the 
Liberal Democrats. Each scale therefore yields three binary variables, with ‘1’ 
indicating a correct placement and ‘0’ indicating an incorrect placement. ‘Don’t 
know’s and responses that placed two parties at the same point on the scale were 
treated as incorrect and coded zero.2  ‘Correct’ rakings on these dimensions were 
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 taken from expert surveys and published manifesto analyses (Bara and Budge 2001; 
Laver 1998). Before the 1992 election, placing parties on the tax-spend and income 
redistribution issues was straightforward for all parties, as both expert surveys and 
manifesto analysis put the parties as running on a left to right spectrum from Labour 
to Conservative, with the Liberal Democrats in between (Laver and Hunt 1992; 
Budge 1999). Whilst there were some major changes in the policy positions of the 
Labour and Liberal Democrat parties after 1992 (Heath et al 2001), the Conservatives 
remained consistently more right-wing than both their opponents on economic 
issues. The ordering of the parties on the European issue is also quite clear. Although 
the Conservative Party strengthened its Eurosceptic view following the 1992 election, 
there was no change in the ordering of the parties on the European dimension issue 
between 1992 and 2001, with the  Conservatives consistently the most Eurosceptic 
and the Liberal Democrats the most Europhile, with Labour somewhere in between 
(Bara and Budge 2001; Budge 1999). 
Confirmatory factor models of the nine derived binary variables showed that 
the indicators taken from the Labour/Liberal Democrat contrasts did not load on the 
same common factor as the variables derived from the Labour/Conservative and 
Liberal Democrat/Conservative contrasts; factor loadings for these items were low 
and the models showed a poor fit to the data. Dropping these items significantly 
improved the fit of the data, with all items loading on the same common factor, 
which we interpret as political knowledge. For our final knowledge measure we 
therefore decided to drop the Labour/Liberal Democrat items, yielding a six item 
scale. This measure, of course, taps only one aspect of political knowledge – what 
Delli Carpini and Keeter term the “people and parties” dimension (Delli Carpini and 
Keeter 1996). We have no indicators of other important components of political 
knowledge, such as knowledge of the institutional structures of government, how 
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 government passes legislation and the names of candidates and representatives. 
Nonetheless, knowledge of the policy positions of the main parties is perhaps the 
most important dimension of political knowledge (Gilens 2001;  and the one we 
might expect to be most responsive to variation in political interest. 
   
Political interest   
Our other key analytical variable is political interest, which is measured at all five 
waves of the pane using the standard question “How much interest do you generally 
have in what is going on in politics? A great deal, quite a lot, some, not very much, 
none at all”.  
 
Analysis 
We begin by fitting a reciprocal effects model to the 1997 cross-sectional data. This is 
equivalent in form to that used by Luskin (1990), although we employ fewer 
exogenous variables and estimate the model with Maximum Likelihood rather than 2 
Stage Least Squares1. Political knowledge, measured as a summed scale, is regressed 
on attention paid to politics in the media and political interest is regressed on an 
indicator of educational attainment. Reciprocal paths run between political 
knowledge and political interest. The path diagram for this model (Model 1), 
showing standardised parameter estimates, is presented in Figure 3. 
 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
                                                 
1 Note that we are not here trying to replicate Luskin’s model, as the same variables are not 
available in our data set. We are merely showing that using an instrumental variable 
approach, identification of these reciprocal parameters is possible. 
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  All four regression paths are significant at the 99% level of confidence or 
below. As with Luskin’s cross-sectional analysis, the parameter estimates support the 
hypothesis of a non-recursive relationship between political interest and political 
knowledge. Measures of overall model fit, however, indicate that the model is 
misspecified (Chi Square = 83 on 2 degrees of freedom, p < 0.001; CFI = .895; RMSEA 
= .143).3 Examination of modification indices reveals that the misspecification relates 
to the constraint of regression paths between education and political interest and 
media attention and political knowledge being zero. These constraints are applied for 
purposes of model identification, rather than on a priori theoretical grounds and are 
clearly not justifiable given the empirical data. So, although the model shows a 
significant relationship in both directions, there are several alternative theoretical 
models that could explain this, beyond the existence of  an actual reciprocal causal 
relationship.  
 First, the misspecification of structural parameters discussed above, could be 
the cause. That is to say the significant paths between knowledge and interest may 
arise due to the empirically unjustified constraints on other regression paths in the 
model. Because the (non-zero) relationships between media attention and knowledge 
and between education and interest are constrained to zero, these effects will 
manifest themselves as spurious correlations between knowledge and interest 
(Finkel, 1995). It is not, of course, possible to test this hypothesis however, because 
such a model would not be identified. Second, it is possible that knowledge and 
interest are causally unrelated to one another but are caused by the same variable(s), 
which are not included in the model. Again, the effects of such unobserved causal 
variables would manifest themselves through the paths linking knowledge and 
interest. A third reason why the apparent reciprocal relationship may in fact be 
spurious is because neither variable makes any correction for error in the 
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 measurement of these latent constructs. It is unlikely, however, that these survey 
questions are perfect measures of the underlying concepts and, to the extent that 
their observed variance is at least partially related to unobserved variables, the effect 
will again be to inflate the magnitude of the association between the uncorrected 
variables (Bohrnstedt and Carter 1971). 
 It is clear, then, that for both statistical and theoretical reasons, cross-sectional 
data does not give much leverage on questions of reciprocal causality and we must 
be extremely cautious when making causal inferences on the basis of this type of 
association. However, in the current instance, because we are able to make use of 
longitudinal measures of both knowledge and interest, we are able to militate some 
of the problems discussed above. We use a cross-lagged panel data model (Campbell 
and Kenny 1999; Finkel 1995; Marsh and Yeung 1997) specified over five waves of 
measurement. Where there are two variables of interest, Y1 and Y2, each variable at t2 
is regressed on both its lagged score and the lagged score of the other variable at t1. 
Cross-lagged panel models are particularly well-suited to examining reciprocal 
causality because they provide an estimate of the (lagged) effect of each variable of 
interest on the other(s), net of autocorrelation of each variable with its lagged 
measurement. Cross-lagged models, therefore, tell us how much variation in X at 
time t1 is able to predict change in variable Y between times t1 and t2, net of controls 
specified in the model. A schematic path diagram of our a priori model is presented 
in Figure 4. 
 
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
 Political knowledge is specified as a latent trait, measured by six observed 
binary indicators, two from each issue placement question. The residual variances of 
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 the knowledge indicators from the same issue question are allowed to covary due to 
their common subject matter and question wording. Factor loadings for the same 
item are constrained to equality across waves to impose meaning invariance on the 
items as measures of political knowledge (Meredith 1993).4 Interest is measured 
using the single indicator described earlier. Given our previous discussion of the 
potential biasing effects of measurement error, this is clearly not ideal but there were 
no suitable additional indicators of political interest administered at all five waves of 
the panel.  
 In the absence of multiple indicators of a concept, it is advisable to set the 
error variance of the single indicator to a plausible value, based on theory, or 
previous research. In this case we used a three item model of political interest from 
variables included in the 1997 wave to obtain an estimate of the error variance of the 
political interest variable. The two indicators, in addition to the item under 
consideration, were ‘interest in political news on the television’ and ‘interest in 
political news in newspapers’. Error variance for a single indicator can be calculated 
as the product of the variance of the item and 1-Cronbach’s Alpha for the scale from 
which it is taken (Hayduk 1987). Application of this formula gives an error variance 
of .23 for political interest in the 1997 wave (scale Alpha = .77; variance of political 
interest = 1). We adjusted this figure to .20 for the subsequent waves because this 
level of increase in reliability between the first two waves of a panel is common in 
attitudinal data (Jagodzinski et al 1987; Sturgis and Allum 2004).  
 The model applies controls for age, sex, educational level and attention paid 
to politics in newspapers, all measured in 1997. Where, after initial model estimation, 
control paths were found to be non-significant, these were constrained to zero and 
the model re-estimated. 
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  The unstandardised path coefficients for the stability and lagged effects are 
constrained to equality across waves. This is based on the rationale that (a) these 
causal influences are likely to be stable over this relatively short period and (b) 
because estimating each effect freely would impose a highly unlikely ‘linear annual’ 
time function on the causal mechanism. There is no reason to assume that knowledge 
and interest influence one another over neat annual cycles and imposing such a 
structure would likely lead to biased estimates of any underlying causal processes 
(Gollob & Reichardt, 1987; Lorenz, Conger, Simons, & Whitbeck, 1995; Sher, Wood & 
Raskin, 1996). Although applying this equality constraint does not provide a solution 
to the problem of mapping discrete measurement intervals on to continuous 
processes, it does give a longer and, therefore, more realistic time frame over which 
to examine the hypothesised relationships. We can think of the cross lagged and 
stability coefficients from this specification then, as representing ‘average’ effects 
over the five year duration of the panel. 
 The final thing of importance to note about the model in Figure 4 is the 
specification of covariances between the disturbance terms, both across and within 
waves, of the endogenous variables. Regression analysis assumes zero order 
coefficients for these parameters and violation of these assumptions results in biased 
estimates of structural parameters (James, Mulaik and Brett 1982). There are good 
reasons to assume, however, that in many instances this assumption is unwarranted. 
If, for example, a third variable, Z, causes both endogenous variables Y1 and Y2 but Z 
is not included in the model, the disturbance terms of Y1 and Y2 will necessarily be 
correlated (Anderson and Williams 1992). The problem is perhaps worse with 
longitudinal data because of the likelihood of auto-correlation between the 
disturbances of the lagged endogenous variables, resulting from a stable unobserved 
cause of the variable in question over time (Williams and Podsakoff 1989). This is not 
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 an esoteric statistical point; failing to account for these error covariance structures 
can lead to seriously flawed causal inference. In particular, it is probable that 
unobserved variable bias will result in incorrect attribution of causal relationships 
between variables (Singer and Willett 2003; Anderson and Williams 1992). As with 
the control variables, if these disturbance covariance paths were found to be non-
significant after initial model estimation, they were constrained to zero and the 
model re-estimated. All models are estimated using WLSMV estimation in MPlus 
2.14 (Muthen and Muthen 2003). 
 Table 1 shows the key unstandardised estimates from the model specified in 
Figure 3.5 Parameters significant at the 95% level of confidence are indicated with an 
asterisk, standard errors are in parentheses and standardised coefficients in bold. The 
first column of Table 1 shows a model which constrains the disturbance covariances 
to zero, the second column shows the same model, with the disturbance covariances 
freely estimated. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Model 2, then, provides continued support for a reciprocal effects model; prior 
knowledge level is significantly and positively related to subsequent change in 
political interest and political interest is equivalently related to political knowledge. 
The stability coefficients are positive, significant and of a high magnitude. Both cross-
lagged effects are, however, weak in magnitude and only just reach statistical 
significance at the 95% confidence level, which is about what we should expect given 
the high stability of these variables over the time period examined; if neither 
construct shows much change at the individual level, we are likely to find that any 
predictors of change exert only a weak effect. 
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  Model 3, however, supports only a uni-directional effects model; once 
covariance paths between disturbance terms are estimated the parameter linking 
political knowledge to subsequent change in political interest becomes non-
significant. Model fit indices show both models fit the data well according to 
conventional criteria (Hu and Bentler 1998). Model 3 appears to show a slight 
improvement in fit, relative to Model 2, though note that WLSMV estimation does 
not yield a Chi Square distribution for nested models to actually test for difference in 
fit between them. We interpret this difference in fit, nonetheless, as supporting the 
inclusion of these parameters in the model.  
 It would seem then, that the initial support for a reciprocal effects model in 
both Models 1 and 2 was artefactual. Using longitudinal data and a more appropriate 
statistical model led to a sharp drop in both statistical significance and magnitude of 
effects between Models 1 and 2. Further controlling for disturbance covariances 
resulted in the regression of interest on knowledge becoming non-significant over 
the duration of the panel. In the light of our earlier discussion of causal inference 
with observational data, it would appear that extant empirical support for a 
reciprocal effects model using cross-sectional data, results largely from unobserved 
variables which are causally antecedent to both knowledge and interest. 
  
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
 Lastly, we investigate the possibility that these findings are peculiar to the 
political context examined. Table 2 shows the same models fitted to the 1992-1997 
British Election Panel Study. Equivalent variables were only included in the 1995-
1997 waves of the panel, so we have fewer observations than were available in 
Models 2 and 3. The results, however, are almost identical; Model 4 supports a 
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 reciprocal effects model with similar coefficient magnitudes and variance estimates 
to those found in Model 4. Again, however, allowing covariance paths between 
disturbance terms to be freely estimated in Model 5 results in the path which 
regresses interest on knowledge becoming non-significant. Both models again fit the 
data well, with Model 5 showing indications of a slight improvement in fit, relative 
to Model 4. 
 
Discussion 
The results we have presented here suggest that rather than knowledge and interest 
being reciprocally related, interest is, in fact, fully exogenous to knowledge, in the 
short to medium term. An increased interest in politics over the course of an electoral 
cycle appears to stimulate a growth in  an individual’s ability to correctly place 
parties on important issue dimensions. We find no evidence, however, to support the 
idea that becoming more knowledgeable about politics leads to higher reported 
interest. These relationships were found to hold in two different election cycles. 
These findings are both counter-intuitive and contrary to the prevailing wisdom in 
political science. What might have given rise to these apparently anomalous 
findings? First, we must consider some limitations to the inferences which can be 
drawn from our own analysis.  
Although our use of repeated measures data gives some leverage on the 
directional flow of causality between our two concepts, the historical period 
available to us is limited to a five year electoral cycle in a single country. In our 
replication analysis, we are only able to make use of an even shorter, three year 
panel. This means we are unable to pick up on more ‘glacial’ individual trajectories 
which, perhaps, begin to develop in adolescence and continue in gradual increments 
throughout the life course. Indeed, such a gradual, life course trajectory fits more 
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 closely with theoretical accounts of the development of political sophistication than 
our electoral cycle ‘snapshot’ (Smith 1989, Luskin 1990). We do not, therefore, 
interpret our findings as demonstrating unequivocally the absence of a causal link 
between political information holding and motivation to acquire political 
information. Our inference is limited to the time period we have been able to 
examine. 
A second limitation of our analysis derives from our operationalisation of 
political knowledge. Although this type of policy information has been argued to be 
the most important dimension of the broader political knowledge construct (cites), 
we are clearly measuring this, and only this, part of the concept. We cannot discount 
the possibility, therefore, that other types of political knowledge may indeed exert a 
causal influence on an individual’s interest in politics over time, including the sorts 
of time periods we have examined here. 
 Having recognised these limitations to the inferences which can be made 
from our analyses, however, we are nonetheless confident that, for this dimension of 
political knowledge, over this short to medium time period, no evidence can be 
found to support a reciprocal causal relationship between political knowledge and 
interest. Furthermore, we believe that our use of repeated measures data and model 
specification yield more valid and reliable estimates of these effects than previous 
investigations, relying as they do on Instrumental variables models on cross-
sectional data, are able to afford.   
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 Figure 1:  A simplified version of Luskin’s model of political interest and political 
knowledge 
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 Figure 2:  Alternative model of political interest and political knowledge 
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 Figure 3: Path Diagram and Parameter Estimates for Model 1 
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  Figure 4: Path Diagram for Longitudinal Model 
 
knowledge
97
pk16e1
pk15e2
pk14e3
pk13e4
pk12e5
pk11e6
knowledge
98
pk26e7
pk25e8
pk24e9
pk23e10
pk22e11
pk21e12
knowledge
99
pk36e13
pk35e14
pk34e15
pk33e16
pk32e17
pk31e18
interest
97
int11 e19
interest
98
int21 e20
interest
99
int31 e21
e22e23
e24e25
e26e27
knowledge
00
pk46e28
pk45e29
pk44e30
pk43e31
pk42e32
pk41e33
knowledge
01
pk56e34
pk55e35
pk54e36
pk53e37
pk52e38
pk51e39
interest
00
int41 e40
interest
01
int51 e41
e42e43
e44e45
control variables
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 27
 Table 1: Estimates of Stability and Lagged Effects from Full Structural Model 1997-2001 
Parameter Model 2 
Disturbance covariances = 
0 
Model 3 
Disturbance covariances estimated 
Knowledge stability 0.927*    (0.012) 
0.920 
0.934*    (0.012) 
0.913 
Interest stability 0.946*    (0.011) 
0.919 
0.994*    (0.013) 
0.966 
Interest ? Knowledge 0.030*    (0.008) 
0.037 
0.030*    (0.008) 
0.036 
Knowledge ? Interest 0.047*    (0.010) 
0.038 
0.007    (0.011) 
0.006 
Source = British Election Panel Study 1992-1997; N=1980; *=significant at p<0.05; 
standard errors in parentheses; standardised coefficients in bold. 
Model 1: Chi Square = 1419, df = 188, p <0.001; CFI = .944; TLI = .973; RMSEA=.057 
Model 2: Chi Square = 13466, df = 187, p <0.001; CFI = .947; TLI = .974; RMSEA=.056 
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 Table 2: Estimates of Stability and Lagged Effects from Full Structural Model 1995-1997 
Parameter Model 4 
Disturbance covariances = 
0 
Model 5 
Disturbance covariances estimated 
Knowledge stability 0.857*    (0.029) 
0.922 
0.868*    (0.030) 
0.933 
Interest stability 0.851*    (0.020) 
0.882 
0.895*    (0.021) 
0.928 
Interest ? Knowledge 0.078*    (0.021) 
0.093 
0.059*    (0.025) 
0.068 
Knowledge ? Interest 0.061*    (0.020) 
0.057 
0.012    (0.024) 
0.011 
Source = British Election Panel Study 1992-1997; N=1980; *=significant at p<0.05; 
standard errors in parentheses; standardised coefficients in bold. 
Model 1: Chi Square = 637, df = 77, p <0.001; CFI = .979; TLI = .986; RMSEA=.074 
Model 2: Chi Square = 5497, df = 76, p <0.001; CFI = .982; TLI = .988; RMSEA=.06 
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Notes 
 
 
1 In some years in Scotland and Wales the scales also asked a question regarding the 
placement of the two nationalist parties; these assessments have not been taken into account 
here however. 
2 Mondak (2001) identifies some technical problems concerning ‘don’t knows’ and item 
format that tend to afflict civics type scales. For example, he points out that open-ended 
questions that ask for, say, the name of the Vice-President, discourage ‘shy’ respondents that 
may have partial knowledge. He argues that knowledge or information scales should be 
designed to limit any don’t know responses and encourage guessing thereby somewhat 
reducing reliability, but increasing validity. We think this is less of a problem since these 
placements are direct tests of knowledge. If one is voting on the basis of these issues then one 
needs to know where the parties stand relative to one another, it seems reasonable to  include 
‘don’t knows’ as incorrect responses.  
3 There is an ongoing debate amongst practitioners of SEM concerning the relative merits of 
measures of ‘exact’ and ‘close’ model fit. We do not attempt to resolve these issues here but 
present both varieties and leave readers to judge the adequacy of the models themselves. 
Because Chi Square is sensitive to sample size and distributional misspecification, alternative 
measures of model fit, which correct for factors such as sample size and complexity of the 
model, are frequently used when sample sizes are large and/or when many parameters are 
being estimated. Hu & Bentler (1999) advocate the use of the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) in 
conjunction with the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA). They suggest cut-
off criteria of > 0.95 for CFI in conjunction with values of RMSEA < 0.06 for acceptable model 
fit. 
4 We impose this constraint because, as specific issues rise and fall as the focus of public and 
media attention during the electoral cycle, we cannot be certain that correctly placing the 
parties on specific issue dimensions remains constant as an indicator of political knowledge 
over time. If this constraint of factorial invariance is not empirically justifiable, it will be 
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manifested in the measures of overall model fit. 
5 Contact lead author for full details of the model, including factor loadings, item thresholds, 
error variances and covariances. 
6 The chi-square value for WLSMV estimation cannot be used for chi-square difference tests. 
7 The chi-square value for WLSMV estimation cannot be used for chi-square difference tests. 
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Appendix 
Question wordings for additional items used to estimate error variance of political interest 
question: 
 
People pay attention to different parts of the television news. When you watch the news on 
television, how much attention do you pay to stories about politics... 
1 ...a great deal, 
2 quite a bit, 
3 some, 
4 a little, 
5 or, none? 
 
People pay attention to different parts of newspapers. When you read (name of paper at), how 
much attention do you pay to stories about politics ...  
1 ...a great deal, 
2 quite a bit, 
3 some, 
4 a little, 
5 or, none? 
 
 
 
